The statement issued on 10 July 2026 by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights concerning Ekrem İmamoğlu and the other defendants in the proceedings relating to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality has once again brought to the forefront the ongoing debate in Türkiye regarding judicial independence and the right to a fair trial. Equally important as the content of the statement is the manner in which it is received. The issue at stake is not merely the criminal proceedings against a particular political figure. Rather, the fundamental question is whether public confidence can be maintained that judicial proceedings involving serious criminal allegations, hundreds of defendants, and intense public attention are being conducted fairly.
Before addressing the substance of the debate, it is essential to distinguish between the relevant legal concepts. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights is not a court. The Commissioner does not determine whether an individual is guilty or innocent, does not replace the jurisdiction of domestic courts, and does not issue legally binding judgments capable of determining the outcome of criminal proceedings. Consequently, the statement should not be treated as if it were a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.
At the same time, however, it would be equally incorrect to dismiss the statement as nothing more than an ordinary political declaration. The Commissioner’s mandate is to monitor the protection of human rights within the member States of the Council of Europe, to draw attention to areas of concern, and to call upon States to fulfil their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Accordingly, although the statement is not legally binding, it nevertheless constitutes an institutional warning that deserves serious consideration in light of Türkiye’s obligations under the Convention.
The principal issues highlighted by the Commissioner concern the defence’s access to the case file and to the evidence, the ability to challenge detention effectively, the defendants’ right to be present during the proceedings, their opportunity to present their defence in full, the principle of equality of arms, the presumption of innocence, judicial independence, and the requirement that allegations of ill-treatment be investigated effectively, independently, and impartially.
One important point should be emphasized from the outset. None of the allegations referred to in the statement automatically become established facts merely because they have been raised. The legally appropriate response is not to repeat those allegations as though they had already been proven, but rather to require the competent authorities to examine them transparently and to provide the public with answers that are open to scrutiny and verification.
In criminal proceedings, justice cannot be measured solely by the judgment ultimately delivered. The procedural guarantees observed from the beginning of the proceedings until their conclusion are equally important. Where it is alleged that a defendant has been denied effective access to the principal evidence contained in the case file, has been unable effectively to challenge the legal grounds for continued detention, or has been excluded from essential stages of the proceedings, such allegations directly concern the right of defence. The right of defence is not a privilege granted at the discretion of the authorities; it is a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The principle of equality of arms must likewise be understood within this framework. This principle does not require the prosecution and the defence to possess mathematically identical resources. It does, however, require that neither party be placed at a substantial and unjustified disadvantage in relation to the other. Where the prosecution has unrestricted access to an extensive investigation file, evidence, and technical resources, while the defence is effectively prevented from examining that same evidence or preparing an adequate response, the mere formal continuation of the proceedings cannot, by itself, satisfy the requirements of a fair trial. The right to a fair hearing must be capable of being exercised effectively in practice, rather than existing merely as a theoretical entitlement on paper.
The scale of the proceedings must also be taken into account when assessing the opportunities afforded to the defence. According to the Commissioner’s statement, the proceedings concern hundreds of defendants, an indictment comprising thousands of pages, and numerous criminal allegations, making this an exceptionally complex criminal case. In proceedings of such magnitude, a careful balance must be maintained between procedural efficiency and the interests of justice. Although adjudication within a reasonable time is undoubtedly important, the objective of accelerating proceedings cannot justify depriving defendants of sufficient opportunity to examine the case file and prepare their defence. Procedural economy can never replace the effective exercise of the right of defence.
The fact that hearings in different proceedings were reportedly scheduled to overlap, thereby requiring defendants and their legal representatives simultaneously to participate in multiple criminal cases, likewise cannot be dismissed as a mere scheduling issue. Effective legal representation requires that defence counsel have sufficient time to prepare, consult with the client, analyse the evidence, and participate meaningfully in the hearing. Where these practical conditions are not genuinely available, the formal presence of defence counsel risks becoming little more than an empty procedural formality. What matters is not simply that a lawyer’s name appears in the case file, but that the lawyer is able effectively to perform the functions required by the right of defence.
The Commissioner’s observations concerning pre-trial detention likewise deserve particular attention. Detention pending trial is not a form of advance punishment. Within criminal procedure, it constitutes an exceptional preventive measure whose purpose is to safeguard the proper administration of justice. Neither the seriousness of the accusations nor the intensity of public debate can, by themselves, justify prolonged detention. Risks such as absconding, interference with evidence, or obstruction of the proceedings must be demonstrated through concrete factual circumstances. Furthermore, judicial authorities must explain why less restrictive measures would be insufficient in the individual case. Decisions extending detention that rely merely on stereotyped or formulaic reasoning undermine the right to liberty and security. This is particularly true where proceedings concern an elected public official who occupies a central position in political competition. In such circumstances, the reasoning supporting continued detention must be sufficiently clear, detailed, and persuasive to command public confidence across society as a whole.
At this point, one may ask whether holding elected office should shield an individual from criminal prosecution. The answer is, of course, no. Democratic legitimacy does not confer criminal immunity upon any person. Public officials may also face criminal accusations and be held accountable before independent courts. Yet, by the same token, an individual’s status as an elected representative cannot justify weakening the right of defence or treating detention as an ordinary procedural measure. From the perspective of the rule of law, the correct standard is straightforward: political office should neither prevent prosecution nor expose an individual to more burdensome procedural treatment.
For this reason, it would be a mistake to reduce the discussion to the binary question of whether Ekrem İmamoğlu is guilty or innocent. Determining criminal responsibility belongs exclusively to the courts. However, whether the court’s eventual judgment will be regarded as legitimate and convincing by society depends upon whether the proceedings themselves are conducted openly, transparently, and fairly. A judgment delivered after a process in which the right of defence has genuinely been respected, the evidence has been subjected to meaningful adversarial examination, and the judge has maintained equal distance from both the prosecution and the defence possesses significantly greater legal legitimacy—even in the eyes of those who may disagree with its outcome.
The frequently invoked argument that statements by international institutions constitute “interference in domestic affairs” must also be assessed within its proper legal context. By becoming a Party to the European Convention on Human Rights, Türkiye accepted that its human rights practices would be subject to international scrutiny. Such scrutiny does not amount to a loss of sovereignty. Rather, it is the legal consequence of obligations voluntarily undertaken by the State itself. Naturally, assessments made by international institutions are also open to criticism. If they rely upon incomplete information, employ unnecessarily political language, or fail accurately to reflect the factual circumstances, those shortcomings should be answered through legal argument supported by documentary evidence. The weakest possible response, however, is not to engage with the substance of the criticism at all, but merely to attack its source.
In my view, the appropriate response to the Commissioner’s statement is not to reject every criticism through a defensive reflex. Rather, judicial authorities and other competent public institutions should provide concrete and transparent answers to every serious allegation raised.
To that end, a number of essential questions require clear responses:
- To what extent has the defence been granted effective access to the case file?
- What concrete factual circumstances make the continued detention of the defendants necessary?
- Upon what legal grounds are restrictions placed upon the defendants’ presence during the hearings?
- Have sufficient time and adequate facilities genuinely been provided to enable the preparation and presentation of the defence?
- Have allegations of ill-treatment been investigated through independent, impartial, and effective procedures?
Convincing answers to these questions protect not only the rights of the defendants, but also the institutional credibility and public authority of the judiciary itself.
In a state governed by the rule of law, public confidence in the judiciary is not achieved by treating courts as institutions beyond criticism. On the contrary, confidence is built when judicial proceedings are open to scrutiny, judicial decisions are supported by reasoned justification, and procedural guarantees are applied fairly and consistently. The true strength of the judiciary lies in its ability to demonstrate that it remains outside political conflict and that it affords the same legal guarantees to every individual, regardless of identity or political affiliation.
The procedural safeguards being debated today in relation to Ekrem İmamoğlu and the other defendants may tomorrow become equally important for a person holding different political views, a journalist, a public servant, or an ordinary citizen. Defending the right to a fair trial, therefore, does not mean defending any particular individual or political movement. It means defending the principle that the State’s power to punish must always remain subject to the limits imposed by law.
In conclusion, the statement issued by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights is neither a judicial conviction nor an acquittal. At the same time, it cannot be dismissed as an ordinary political declaration that deserves no legal attention. Rather, it raises serious questions concerning the independence of the judiciary in Türkiye, the effective exercise of the right of defence, and the exceptional nature of pre-trial detention. The strongest response to these concerns is not the issuance of forceful political statements, but the conduct of judicial proceedings that are demonstrably fair, transparent, and complete.
Ultimately, the true test of a state governed by the rule of law is not whether it predetermines the outcome of judicial proceedings, but whether it ensures that, whatever the outcome may be, every individual can genuinely believe that the decision was reached through a fair process.
REFERENCES
- Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement concerning the proceedings against Ekrem İmamoğlu and the other defendants in the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality case, 10 July 2026.
- Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye, Article 36.
- European Convention on Human Rights, Articles 5 and 6.
- Relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning:
- the right to a fair trial,
- equality of arms,
- judicial independence,
- the right of defence,
- the right to liberty and security,
- and the presumption of innocence.
